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M I C H A El L A . K A T Z 
BURBIDGE AND MITCHELL 
A P A R T N E R S H I P O F P R O F E S S I O N A L C O R P O R A T I O N S 
A T T O R N E Y S A N D C O U N S E L O R S A T L A W 
1 3 9 E A S T S O U T H T E M P L E , S U I T E 2 0 0 1 
S A L T L A K E C I T Y , U T A H 84i 11 
T E L E P H O N E 
( S O I ) 3 5 5 - 6 6 7 7 
F A C S I M I L E N U M B E R 
( S O I) 3 5 5 - 2 3 4 1 
hj: • i i ] 2 2 , 11 9 9 1 F I L E D 
Mr. Geof f r ey J . B u t l e r 
C l e r k of t h e C o u r t 
Utah Supreme C o u r t 
332 S t a t e C a p i t a l 
S a n Tiake e^-- ' { 
APR 2 2 1991 
CLERK SUPREME COURT, 
UTAH 
Re: Duncan, et al. v. Union Pacific Railroad and State 
of Utah - Case No. 900233 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
li :i accord with Rul e 2 4 (j) , IJtal I Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Appellants/Plaintiffs submit their response to the 
supplemental filing of the State of Utah in the above proceedirlg. 
Specifically, at issue is if a recent United States Supreme Court 
opinion impacts on whether UDOT's decision on safety devices at 
the rail crossing constitutes policy-making (immune) or is 
operational in nature (not protected), and; if recent revisions 
to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act somehow shed light on the 
i ntei :acti on between Utah Code Ai in. § 63-30-8 and § 63-30-] 0. 
Respondent State submits that United States v. Gaubert, 
DI U.J.^.W. 4244 (March 26, 1991), a case under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act somehow upsets the delicate balance struck by the Utah 
Supreme Court: as to whether any given decision by a governmental 
••••* ; • y is immune policy-making or one for which immunity has been 
\iiv«rd as being operational in nature. In so arguing, Respondent 
essentially asks the Court, to overturn a ] onq line of Utah cases 
rejecting immunity in Light of the fact that the challenged 
decisions were operational. See, Doe v. Argue lies, 716 r ' 3. 3 
(Utah 1985) and cases cited at 283, including Biqelow v. 
Ingersol, 618 P.2d 50 (IJ t a h 1 9 80) . 
Per this Utah author! ty, discussed at Point II.C of 
Appellant's Brief, the acts of UDOT in analyzing if a crossing 
deserves upgrades implement a pre-existing policy (established 
through enactment of the Manual on Unifor m Traffic Control 
Devices) , are who] ly operational i i :i nature and undeserving of 
Mr. Geoffrey J, Butler 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Supreme Court 
April 22, 1991 
Page 2 
protection through discretionary function immunity. Considering 
this fact, even under Gaubert's expansive definition of "policy-
making" there is substantial room to find that UDOT's 
determinations do not constitute the exercise of a discretionary 
function. 
Respondent's contention that a recent amendment to § 
63-30-8 warrants a decision in its favor must also be rejected. 
The amendment, which specifically subjects the immunity waiver 
for injury from defective highway conditions to a discretionary 
function exception, actually supports Appellant's arguments. The 
absence of a limitation on the immunity waiver in 63-30-8 is 
indicative of prior legislative intent that the waiver be 
unrestricted. There is nothing in the legislative history behind 
the amendment relied upon by Respondents to suggest anything 
other than a change of heart by the House and Senate. 
Furthermore, adopting Respondent's argument carries 
with it the natural consequence of retroactive application of the 
amendment, something the statute expressly precludes. See also 
Irvine v. Salt Lake County, 785 P.2d 411 (Utah 1989) where the 
court refused to apply an amendment to the Governmental Immunity 
Act retroactively to bar a cause of action which had already 
arisen when the change went into effect. As such, the numerous 
Utah cases which have held that discretionary function immunity 
is not a modification to the waiver set forth in 63-30-8 still 
apply and mandate a ruling in Appellants favor. 
Should the Court be in need of further assistance with 
respect to the above, please feel free to advise counsel. 
Very truly yours, 
MAK/aw 
cc Allan L. Larson, Esq. 
J. Clare Williams, Esq. 
James R. Soper, Esq. 
